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Foreword 
For most for-profit companies, steady growth is the surest path to success. How to 
grow—whether by opening new divisions, developing branches or franchising 
operations, acquiring other companies, or taking any number of other possible 
approaches—comes down to a matter of choice and opportunity for each individual 
company. Whichever path a company pursues, more often than not it can be assured it 
will have access to ample information about the benefits and risks of each option, 
talent to help execute its chosen strategy, and money to finance its growth. 
In the nonprofit sector, the picture is much different. Few, if any, of those same 
resources are available to growth-minded nonprofits—especially organizations in the 
social-service sector that aspire to serve more people. 
This is one of the first truths our two organizations had to confront when we began 
working together several years ago to strengthen organizations in the youth-service 
field. Through its grant-making, the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation helps high-
performing youth-serving organizations develop and then implement growth plans that 
the Foundation and they hope will lead to better services provided to more and more 
young people from low-income backgrounds. The Bridgespan Group, through its work 
with the Foundation and others, helps high-performing nonprofits develop viable 
strategies for increasing their social impact while building knowledge for the sector 
more broadly. 
Our collective understanding of the state of the field and the challenges facing 
organizations that want to become healthier, stronger, and more effective has been 
deepened by our work. At the same time, gaps in our knowledge about the nature of 
growth in the nonprofit sector have become more obvious. To explore some of these 
issues and to help answer questions that might enable us and others interested in 
building stronger nonprofits be more effective, we undertook this study. Over the 
course of several months, leaders of 20 youth-serving organizations that grew 
significantly in recent years took part in extensive interviews about their experiences. 
They also allowed us to develop individual case studies to further illuminate the 
changes the organizations went through over the years. In addition to the interviews 
 4
and case studies, researchers collected data on well over 1,000 youth-serving 
organizations around the nation. 
As the study shows, nonprofit organizations that are intent on expanding the scale of 
their services face notable challenges. For example, even after years of growth, the 
financial condition of well-known and good-sized youth-serving organizations remains 
remarkably fragile. Funding for organizational improvements consistently lags the need 
for them, putting stress on the entire organization and particularly its leadership. 
Contrary to experiences in the corporate sector, economies of scale and operating 
efficiencies are hard to come by. And though foundations can and sometimes do fund 
growth, they are unlikely to sustain it. Accordingly, the need to think about fundraising 
never lessens but rather becomes a greater and greater challenge the larger an 
organization grows. 
These and many other observations are to be found throughout this white paper. For 
them, we are indebted to the organizations that agreed to participate in the tedious 
business of responding to questions, questionnaires, and extensive interviewing.  
In the end, of course, this effort will only be meaningful if the information it contains is 
useful to other foundations and funders that are committed to building a stronger and 
more effective nonprofit sector, and to the nonprofit organizations that are thinking 
about growing. To them—and the potential social good they represent—we dedicate 
this report. 
 
Michael A. Bailin    Jeffrey L. Bradach 
President      Managing Director & Co-founder 
The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation  The Bridgespan Group     
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Introduction 
Growth is a critical component of strategy for many organizations that directly serve 
youth and those that support them, including ours. The Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation (EMCF) pursues its mission of “improving the lives of people from low-
income communities” by “helping high-performing nonprofit organizations increase 
their capacity to serve more young people from low-income backgrounds (ages 9 to 
24) with quality programs during out-of-school time.”1 The Bridgespan Group’s mission 
is to “work to build a better world by strengthening the ability of nonprofit organizations 
to achieve breakthrough results in addressing society’s most important challenges and 
opportunities.”2 Aiding direct-service organizations in their efforts to develop and 
implement strategies with the potential to achieve significant results through growth is 
a fundamental aspect of the way in which Bridgespan seeks to accomplish its mission. 
Growth is a noteworthy phenomenon among organizations that serve youth. Between 
1997 and 2002, the number of organizations in the youth-service field grew by 41 
percent, while the funds those organizations received grew by 70 percent from $4.7 
billion to $8 billion. Of this new funding, two-thirds (some $2 billion) was invested in 
established organizations, while the remainder went to nonprofits created during this 
period.3   
For both of these reasons, in January 2004 EMCF commissioned a research project of 
which this white paper is a part. Together, we set out to explore growth in U.S. youth-
serving organizations: the prevalence of growth, the factors that were critical in 
shaping how these organizations grew, and the major consequences of growth. We 
hoped that by increasing our understanding of this phenomenon, we could become 
                                                     
1 www.emcf.org  
2 www.bridgespangroup.org  
3 These figures come from a Bridgespan analysis of National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) 
data. Please see Appendix A for an overview of this research. 
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more effective in our own work. We also hoped that these efforts would be useful for 
other organizations committed to supporting nonprofits that serve young people.  
One of the chief components of the study was an in-depth look at 20 youth-serving 
organizations that experienced significant growth in recent years. Exhibit 1 provides a 
brief overview of each of the participating organizations. Exhibit 2 provides data on the 
number of youth each served in 2003 and its revenue growth from 1999 through 2003. 
Exhibit 3 shows a breakout of these organizations into three categories: organizations 
that attempted to expand nationally (multi-site); organizations that grew locally or 
regionally (single-site); and local affiliates of established national organizations. 
(Appendix B discusses the methodology of the study.)    
Over a period of four months, members of the research team visited the participating 
organizations to interview key members of the management teams and, in some 
cases, members of their boards. In these and subsequent discussions, we asked a 
wide range of questions addressing six main topics: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The organization’s motivation for growth and the extent to which growth was 
planned; 
The form that expansion had taken; 
The ways in which growth was financed; 
The extent to which growth involved changes in and/or codification of the 
organization’s program and attempts to measure program outcomes; 
The kind of changes that took place within the organization in response to 
growth; 
Factors external to the organization that affected its growth. 
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Exhibit 3: Structure of organizations studied
Affiliates of multi-site 
organizations
• The Big Sister Association 
of Greater Boston
• Boys & Girls Clubs of 
Greater Washington
• Communities In Schools 
of Atlanta
• Girls Incorporated of 
Alameda County
Multi-site organizations
• Citizen Schools
• College Summit
• Earth Force
• Jumpstart
• National Foundation for 
Teaching 
Entrepreneurship
• The Posse Foundation
• Public Allies
• The Steppingstone 
Foundation
• Summer Search 
• YouthBuild USA
Single-site organizations
• After School Matters
• The East Bay 
Conservation Corps
• The Fulfillment Fund
• Harlem Children’s Zone
• Larkin Street Youth 
Services
• Youth In Need
 
In addition, during this phase and in the months following it, we gathered quantitative 
data about the revenues and costs of each of these organizations, reaching as far back 
into their growth history as their records would allow. Further, we surveyed the 
participants to quantify a number of the observations that emerged from the interviews. 
Finally, we gathered the executive directors (or their equivalents) of the 20 
organizations in New York to present a preliminary version of the study’s findings, both 
testing their accuracy and developing new insights from the discussion.  
This research produced a wealth of information about the experience and effects of 
growth in youth-serving organizations—far more than could be encompassed in a 
single document. As a result, we have chosen to present the material in two formats: a 
series of 20 case studies, which capture the particulars of each organization’s growth 
story; and this white paper, which presents the observations that emerged most 
consistently across the interviews and data-gathering process.  
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Broadly speaking, these observations fall into four categories: the path of growth, the 
financial consequences of growth, the organizational consequences of growth, and the 
“chutes and ladders” of growth (i.e., those factors that helped or hindered these 
organizations as they grew). In the pages that follow, we look at each of these topics in 
turn and then conclude by offering some ideas about the implications of the study for 
funders, like EMCF, that want to support the growth of effective youth-serving 
organizations.  
Before beginning, however, a few cautions are in order. First and foremost, it is worth 
underscoring what a study such as this can—and cannot—do. Taking a relatively 
intensive look at 20 organizations allowed us to consider varying approaches to a 
common set of challenges and to identify a number of apparent trends. At the same 
time, these 20 organizations do not constitute a representative sample of youth-serving 
organizations, nor is the sample large enough to allow the results to be of statistical 
significance.  
Second, because the effect of growth on youth-serving organizations was one of the 
project’s chief concerns, we excluded nonprofits that failed to grow—or chose not to 
grow—from the study. As a result, while these pages include examples of practices 
that appear to be reasonably effective in supporting successful growth, the most we 
can say is that these are current practices, not that any individual one of them 
represents a “best” practice. 
Finally, in choosing examples of successful growth, we defined success in terms of the 
quantity of services offered (as measured by growth in the number of youth served and 
in the organization’s revenues) and not in terms of the quality and effectiveness of 
those services (as measured by good youth-service programming and by positive 
effects on the participants). To assess the latter, we would have had to evaluate each 
program and compare the results of growth to other options (such as program 
improvements) that the organization itself could have taken or that its funders could 
have supported—both of which were beyond the scope of this study. As a result, 
inclusion in this paper reflects neither positively nor negatively on the nature nor 
effectiveness of the programs these organizations provide, but only on the fact that 
they were able to expand significantly the delivery of those programs.   
 13
The Path of Growth 
One of our study’s central objectives was to understand how and why this set of 
organizations had grown. In the interviews we asked participants about their 
organizations’ motivation and planning for growth as well as about the form that growth 
had taken. While the answers were many and varied, two trends emerged: the 
interplay between opportunity and strategy as the organizations grew; and the need for 
multi-site organizations to balance—and rebalance—the degree of local autonomy and 
central control. 
Observation 1: Growth was more often a response to opportunity than 
the result of strategic choice.   
All these organizations grew because their leaders saw—and seized—opportunities to 
acquire funding, talented staff, or both. There were literally as many examples as there 
were participants. Organizations like NFTE, Youth In Need, and Communities In 
Schools of Atlanta were responsive to funders who wanted to see them run more 
programs in more areas. Summer Search went to Boston because of Jay Jacobs, then 
a site leader and now the CEO. “Why Boston,” founder Linda Mornell commented. 
“Because I met Jay and that was where he lived.” Earth Force president Vince 
Meldrum described a similar approach to expansion: “If we can find the right staff 
members, then we go there. [Starting a new site] is a 70-hour per week job, and it 
takes a very committed individual.”   
Given the difficulty of acquiring resources, and the fact that few (if any) nonprofits can 
fund their own growth, it is not surprising that seizing opportunities as they presented 
themselves figured prominently in these organizations’ growth stories. The challenge 
lay in differentiating genuine opportunities from will-o-the-wisps, which could 
compromise or even undermine their missions. As Chuck Harris, a member of College 
Summit’s board and its interim vice president of development noted, “There is a risk of 
being diverted [from our mission] by good ideas. This is especially apparent in 
foundations’ [requests for proposals].” Cognizant of this danger, College Summit is 
attempting to raise a multi-million dollar fund that would allow it to focus on its core 
services over the next few years while sustaining its growth.   
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A few of the organizations in the study admitted to having to rationalize the addition of 
some programs retrospectively and, in some cases, changing the mission (as many as 
three times) to reflect the new direction. While such growth could be exciting to both 
staff and funders, it could also be confusing: “Ask 100 people in this organization why 
we’re here,” one CEO admitted, “and you’ll get 100 different answers.” To manage the 
risk of mission drift, many of the organizations in the study appeared to be moving 
toward what we have called “strategic opportunism.” By this, we mean that they were 
developing explicit criteria (such as a designated level of community support, 
availability of funding, presence of qualified staff, and/or connectedness to mission or 
strategy) for screening growth opportunities.  
The Posse Foundation is one of the most stringent organizations in this regard. A new 
site must have at least three years of start-up funding secured before expansion can 
take place. Before opening a new site, Posse also performs a feasibility study, which 
examines not only funding opportunities, but demographics, geographic realities, and 
the level of demonstrated need among public-school children. For Earth Force and 
Summer Search, the critical factor is having qualified staff to lead new sites. For 
example, even though Summer Search had secured both community support and 
funding for a new office in Seattle, they waited two years to open the site, until they 
had identified the right director.  
In several cases, the learning-by-doing of early growth initiatives underscored the need 
for a more deliberate approach. Jumpstart, which at first would “go anywhere,” 
according to Rob Waldron, its current president and CEO, because, “it’s like being 
asked to the prom, you’re just so glad to have been asked,” now thinks more actively 
about the operational challenges of managing a  geographically-dispersed network. 
Similarly, NFTE’s president and founder Steve Marrioti described how: “From 1987 to 
1990, we were just trying to stay alive. I was totally open. Now it is more structured, 
and I think it is better.”   
Both NFTE and College Summit supplemented their experiential learning by engaging 
in a formal strategy process, which helped identify the prerequisites for successful 
growth. Recognizing that they would need to develop a strong presence in (and 
therefore invest deeply in) specific communities to effect significant change, College 
Summit developed a list of criteria for prospective geographies. It also drew back from 
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certain locations it had already begun to explore. Using another approach to managing 
risk, Girls Incorporated of Alameda County created a tool which includes a clear set of 
criteria for evaluating how well a new program opportunity fits with the organization’s 
mission. 
The experience of these organizations points to the importance of being deliberate 
about responding to growth opportunities. It also suggests the potential usefulness of 
viewing strategy not as an unchanging roadmap but more as a set of guardrails within 
which new opportunities can be pursued. As Patty Pflum, the executive director of 
Communities In Schools of Atlanta commented, “our strategic plan helped us be able 
to say ‘no’ to certain things.” By carefully screening prospects that came their way, the 
organizations could reduce the likelihood that they would be pulled in directions that 
would distract them from their missions and strain their capabilities.   
Observation 2: For organizations with multiple sites, finding the right 
balance between local autonomy and central control was a recurring 
challenge.  
Nonprofits engaged in replicating programs in new geographic locations can be 
arrayed along a spectrum according to the level of control maintained by a central 
office or headquarters.4 At one end of the spectrum are organizations that try to 
expand their reach by sharing their model with other organizations, formally or 
informally.5 At the opposite end of the spectrum are organizations that choose to 
expand by building branches, with a single national office holding both ultimate 
decision-making power and the organization’s 501(c)(3) designation. These branches 
can be organized in ways that are characterized as tight or loose, depending on the 
                                                     
4 See, for example, J. Gregory Dees, Beth Battle Anderson, and Jane Wei-Skillern, “Scaling Social 
Impact,” and Jeffrey L. Bradach, “Going to Scale,” in Stanford Social Innovation Review. 
5 We excluded organizations whose primary mode of growth is model dissemination, because they are 
unlikely to face the same issues as those that assert at least a moderate level of control over their 
growth. Several organizations in the study have used model dissemination as a secondary strategy, 
however, and almost all seem to have shared their program model informally at some point. 
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degree of control exercised by the national office over the branches’ governance, 
financial operations and programs. Between these two extremes are nonprofits that 
have grown by creating some sort of partnership or affiliation with other independent 
501(c)(3) organizations. In many cases, the responsibilities of each party are 
contractually defined and, as is the case with branches, these affiliate relationships 
range from tight to loose.  
The multi-site organizations we studied chose different points along this spectrum of 
control to begin their geographic expansion. For example, Public Allies and YouthBuild 
USA started out with far less central decision-making than Earth Force and Posse. 
Over time, however, all of them moved away from either end of the spectrum to 
organization structures that encompassed both aspects of centralization (national 
control or site uniformity) and elements of decentralization (local autonomy and site 
variability). Several set out by trying to empower their sites as much as possible but 
reduced local autonomy when the sites ran into trouble or demanded more control. 
Others—principally organizations that were particularly sensitive to maintaining a 
consistent program model, quality, and culture—started out relatively centralized but 
delegated more autonomy to their sites when the organization became too costly or 
complex. (Exhibit 4 provides a snapshot of each organization’s evolution. For more 
detail, please see the case studies.) 
The organizations that evolved from a structure in which local sites operated with 
complete, or almost complete, autonomy toward one with a greater measure of central 
control tended to be: (1) responding to requests from the sites for quality control and/or 
reinforcement of the brand; or (2) striving to share costs or manage risk.  
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e 
ov
er
 e
xp
an
si
on
, 
q
u
al
it
y 
st
an
d
ar
d
s,
 b
ac
k-
of
fi
ce
 
p
ro
ce
ss
es
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
b
ra
n
d
.
S
u
m
m
er
 S
ea
rc
h
B
os
to
n
-b
as
ed
 S
te
p
p
in
gs
to
n
e 
op
er
at
es
 a
 b
ra
n
ch
 i
n
 P
h
ila
d
el
ph
ia
. 
S
te
p
pi
n
g
st
on
e 
in
te
n
d
ed
 t
o 
on
ly
 l
oo
se
ly
 m
an
a
g
e 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
, 
b
u
t 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
 t
u
rn
ed
 o
u
t 
to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
re
lia
n
t 
(f
in
an
ci
al
ly
 a
n
d 
m
an
ag
er
ia
lly
) 
on
 B
os
to
n
 t
h
an
 p
la
n
n
ed
. 
S
te
p
p
in
g
st
on
e 
n
ow
 b
el
ie
ve
s 
th
at
 l
oc
al
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 i
s 
th
e 
ke
y 
to
 s
u
cc
es
s,
 a
n
d 
p
la
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
Ph
ila
de
lp
h
ia
 s
it
e 
to
 b
ec
om
e 
it
s 
ow
n
 5
0
1
(c
)(
3
) 
w
it
h
 a
ff
ili
at
e 
st
a
tu
s.
S
te
p
p
in
g
st
o
n
e
Pu
b
lic
 A
lli
es
 s
ta
rt
ed
 a
s 
a 
lo
os
e 
b
ra
n
ch
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
, 
p
ro
vi
di
n
g
 s
it
es
 a
 g
re
at
 d
ea
l 
of
 d
is
cr
et
io
n
 t
o 
m
ir
ro
r 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
’s
 m
is
si
on
 o
f 
d
ev
el
op
in
g
 l
oc
a
l 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y 
le
ad
er
sh
ip
. 
Th
is
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 b
ec
am
e 
u
n
su
st
ai
n
ab
le
, 
as
 n
a
ti
on
al
 
w
as
 u
n
ab
le
 t
o 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 s
it
e-
le
ve
l 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s 
bu
t 
w
as
 l
ia
b
le
 f
or
 t
h
ei
r 
p
er
si
st
en
t 
b
u
d
g
et
 d
ef
ic
it
s.
 T
h
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 h
as
 
b
eg
u
n
 e
xp
er
im
en
ti
n
g
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
lic
en
se
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
. 
P
u
b
lic
 A
lli
es
Po
ss
e 
d
ec
id
ed
 o
n
 a
 t
ig
h
t 
b
ra
n
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 t
o 
en
su
re
 a
 c
on
si
st
en
t
cu
lt
u
re
 a
n
d
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
q
u
al
it
y 
ac
ro
ss
 e
ac
h
 s
it
e.
 B
u
t 
as
 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 g
re
w
, 
ra
is
in
g
 m
on
ey
 a
t 
th
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 l
ev
el
 t
o 
fu
n
d 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
es
 b
ec
am
e 
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
 c
h
al
le
n
g
in
g
. 
Po
ss
e 
re
ce
n
tl
y 
b
eg
an
 t
o 
h
ir
e 
a 
la
ye
r 
of
 l
oc
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t,
 s
o 
si
te
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
ru
n
 t
h
ei
r 
ow
n
 o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
T
h
e 
P
o
ss
e 
Fo
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
N
FT
E
 b
eg
an
 w
it
h
 a
 l
oo
se
ly
 c
on
tr
o
lle
d
 n
et
w
or
k 
o
f 
b
ra
n
ch
es
, 
af
fi
lia
te
s,
 a
n
d
 l
ic
en
se
es
, 
bu
t 
h
as
 p
er
io
d
ic
al
ly
 c
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 
se
le
ct
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s,
 n
am
el
y 
ce
n
tr
al
iz
in
g
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
to
 i
m
p
ro
v
e 
re
co
rd
 k
ee
p
in
g
, 
an
d 
d
ev
el
op
in
g
 a
 s
et
 o
f 
co
m
m
on
 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
to
 r
es
to
re
 p
ro
g
ra
m
m
at
ic
 o
rd
er
.
N
FT
E
Ju
m
p
st
ar
t 
b
eg
an
 w
it
h
 a
 l
oo
se
 b
ra
n
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
, 
b
u
t 
th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
f
su
p
p
or
ti
n
g
, 
op
er
at
in
g
, 
an
d
 f
u
n
d
in
g 
si
te
s 
b
ec
am
e 
u
n
m
an
ag
ea
b
le
 a
s 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 g
re
w
. 
In
 1
9
9
9
, 
Ju
m
p
st
ar
t 
tr
an
si
ti
on
ed
 t
o 
h
a
vi
n
g 
co
lle
g
es
 a
n
d 
u
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
 l
ic
en
se
 
it
s 
pr
og
ra
m
, 
le
v
er
ag
in
g 
th
e 
ed
u
ca
ti
on
al
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
on
s’
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 a
n
d 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 t
o 
sp
ee
d
 g
ro
w
th
.
Ju
m
p
st
a
rt
E
ar
th
 F
or
ce
’s
 n
et
w
or
k 
in
cl
u
d
es
 a
 m
ix
 o
f 
b
ra
n
ch
es
, 
lic
en
se
es
, 
an
d
 o
n
e 
af
fi
lia
te
. 
Th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 in
it
ia
lly
 m
an
ag
ed
 i
ts
 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 m
od
el
 t
ig
h
tl
y,
 b
u
t 
lo
os
en
ed
 t
h
e 
re
ig
n
s 
p
er
 s
it
e 
re
qu
es
ts
to
 t
ai
lo
r 
th
e 
m
od
el
 t
o 
lo
ca
l 
n
ee
d
s.
 N
at
io
n
al
 i
s 
re
cl
ai
m
in
g
 a
 p
or
ti
on
 o
f 
it
s 
ol
d 
co
n
tr
ol
, 
h
ow
ev
er
, 
a
ft
er
 b
ei
n
g 
u
n
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
so
m
e 
p
ro
g
ra
m
s.
E
a
rt
h
 F
o
rc
e
C
ol
le
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
 s
ta
rt
ed
 a
s 
a 
ti
g
h
tl
y 
co
n
tr
ol
le
d 
br
an
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
w
it
h
 m
os
t 
of
 i
ts
 b
ac
k-
of
fi
ce
 i
n
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
m
ai
n
ta
in
ed
 f
ro
m
 h
ea
d
qu
ar
te
rs
. 
T
o 
lig
h
te
n
 t
h
e 
lo
a
d
 o
n
 n
at
io
n
a
l 
a
n
d 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
of
fi
ce
s 
m
or
e 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
, 
C
ol
le
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
 h
as
 b
eg
u
n
 s
h
if
ti
n
g
 s
om
e 
re
sp
on
si
b
ili
ti
es
 (
su
ch
 a
s 
fi
n
di
n
g
lo
ca
l 
of
fi
ce
 s
p
ac
e)
 d
ow
n
 t
o 
th
e 
si
te
 l
ev
el
.
C
o
lle
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
C
it
iz
en
 S
ch
oo
ls
 l
ic
en
se
s 
it
s 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 t
o 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y-
b
as
ed
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s 
an
d 
sc
h
oo
l 
di
st
ri
ct
s 
an
d 
p
ro
vi
d
es
 t
h
em
 w
it
h
 
on
-g
oi
n
g
 t
ra
in
in
g
, 
cu
rr
ic
u
lu
m
, 
an
d 
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 s
u
p
p
or
t.
 W
h
ile
 t
h
e 
in
it
ia
l 
p
la
n
 w
as
 t
o 
h
av
e 
lo
os
e 
g
u
id
el
in
es
, 
se
ve
ra
l 
lic
en
se
es
 a
sk
ed
 f
or
 h
el
p
 i
n
 r
ep
lic
at
in
g 
th
e 
ex
ac
t 
C
it
iz
en
 S
ch
oo
ls
 c
u
rr
ic
u
lu
m
. 
C
it
iz
en
 S
ch
oo
ls
 t
h
en
 b
eg
an
 c
re
at
in
g
 a
 
d
et
ai
le
d 
m
et
h
od
ol
og
y 
fo
r 
la
u
n
ch
in
g 
n
ew
 s
it
es
.
C
it
iz
en
 S
ch
o
o
ls
N
et
w
or
k 
ev
ol
u
ti
on
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
E
xh
ib
it
 4
: 
N
et
w
o
rk
 e
vo
lu
ti
on
 o
f 
m
u
lt
i-
si
te
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s 
st
u
d
ie
d
E
ar
ly
 o
n
, 
th
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 o
ff
ic
e 
di
d
 n
ot
 o
w
n
, 
co
n
tr
ol
, 
or
 h
av
e 
lic
en
si
n
g
 a
g
re
em
en
ts
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
si
te
s,
 b
u
t 
lo
ca
l 
as
ke
d
 
n
a
ti
on
al
 t
o 
p
ro
te
ct
 t
h
e 
b
ra
n
d
. 
M
or
e 
th
an
 h
al
f 
of
 i
ts
 s
it
es
 a
re
 n
ow
 o
p
er
a
ti
n
g
 a
s 
af
fi
lia
te
s,
 a
lt
h
ou
g
h
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n
 i
s 
n
ot
 
m
an
d
at
or
y.
 T
h
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
’s
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 d
ir
ec
to
r 
h
as
 a
ls
o 
d
ev
el
op
ed
 a
 h
an
d
b
oo
k 
th
at
 o
ff
er
s 
n
ew
 s
it
es
 a
 s
tr
on
g 
b
lu
ep
ri
n
t 
fr
om
 w
h
ic
h
 t
o 
bu
ild
.
Y
o
u
th
B
u
ild
 U
S
A
S
u
m
m
er
 S
ea
rc
h
 s
ta
rt
ed
 o
ff
 w
it
h
 a
 l
oo
se
 b
ra
n
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 w
it
h
 l
oc
al
 b
oa
rd
s.
 T
o 
re
d
u
ce
 c
os
ts
, 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 s
h
if
te
d 
b
ac
k-
of
fi
ce
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
si
te
s 
to
 t
h
e 
n
a
ti
on
al
 o
ff
ic
e.
 T
o 
en
su
re
 g
re
at
er
 p
ro
g
ra
m
 c
on
si
st
en
cy
 a
n
d 
co
n
tr
ol
 o
ve
r 
ea
ch
 b
ra
n
ch
, 
in
 2
0
0
2
 i
t 
cr
ea
te
d 
a 
n
at
io
n
al
 b
oa
rd
 t
o 
w
it
h
 a
 m
an
d
at
e 
ov
er
 e
xp
an
si
on
, 
q
u
al
it
y 
st
an
d
ar
d
s,
 b
ac
k-
of
fi
ce
 
p
ro
ce
ss
es
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
b
ra
n
d
.
S
u
m
m
er
 S
ea
rc
h
B
os
to
n
-b
as
ed
 S
te
p
p
in
gs
to
n
e 
op
er
at
es
 a
 b
ra
n
ch
 i
n
 P
h
ila
d
el
ph
ia
. 
S
te
p
pi
n
g
st
on
e 
in
te
n
d
ed
 t
o 
on
ly
 l
oo
se
ly
 m
an
a
g
e 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
, 
b
u
t 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
 t
u
rn
ed
 o
u
t 
to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
re
lia
n
t 
(f
in
an
ci
al
ly
 a
n
d 
m
an
ag
er
ia
lly
) 
on
 B
os
to
n
 t
h
an
 p
la
n
n
ed
. 
S
te
p
p
in
g
st
on
e 
n
ow
 b
el
ie
ve
s 
th
at
 l
oc
al
 o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 i
s 
th
e 
ke
y 
to
 s
u
cc
es
s,
 a
n
d 
p
la
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
Ph
ila
de
lp
h
ia
 s
it
e 
to
 b
ec
om
e 
it
s 
ow
n
 5
0
1
(c
)(
3
) 
w
it
h
 a
ff
ili
at
e 
st
a
tu
s.
S
te
p
p
in
g
st
o
n
e
Pu
b
lic
 A
lli
es
 s
ta
rt
ed
 a
s 
a 
lo
os
e 
b
ra
n
ch
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
, 
p
ro
vi
di
n
g
 s
it
es
 a
 g
re
at
 d
ea
l 
of
 d
is
cr
et
io
n
 t
o 
m
ir
ro
r 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
’s
 m
is
si
on
 o
f 
d
ev
el
op
in
g
 l
oc
a
l 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y 
le
ad
er
sh
ip
. 
Th
is
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 b
ec
am
e 
u
n
su
st
ai
n
ab
le
, 
as
 n
a
ti
on
al
 
w
as
 u
n
ab
le
 t
o 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 s
it
e-
le
ve
l 
pr
ac
ti
ce
s 
bu
t 
w
as
 l
ia
b
le
 f
or
 t
h
ei
r 
p
er
si
st
en
t 
b
u
d
g
et
 d
ef
ic
it
s.
 T
h
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 h
as
 
b
eg
u
n
 e
xp
er
im
en
ti
n
g
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
lic
en
se
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
. 
P
u
b
lic
 A
lli
es
Po
ss
e 
d
ec
id
ed
 o
n
 a
 t
ig
h
t 
b
ra
n
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 t
o 
en
su
re
 a
 c
on
si
st
en
t
cu
lt
u
re
 a
n
d
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
q
u
al
it
y 
ac
ro
ss
 e
ac
h
 s
it
e.
 B
u
t 
as
 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 g
re
w
, 
ra
is
in
g
 m
on
ey
 a
t 
th
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 l
ev
el
 t
o 
fu
n
d 
th
e 
b
ra
n
ch
es
 b
ec
am
e 
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
 c
h
al
le
n
g
in
g
. 
Po
ss
e 
re
ce
n
tl
y 
b
eg
an
 t
o 
h
ir
e 
a 
la
ye
r 
of
 l
oc
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t,
 s
o 
si
te
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
ru
n
 t
h
ei
r 
ow
n
 o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s.
T
h
e 
P
o
ss
e 
Fo
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
N
FT
E
 b
eg
an
 w
it
h
 a
 l
oo
se
ly
 c
on
tr
o
lle
d
 n
et
w
or
k 
o
f 
b
ra
n
ch
es
, 
af
fi
lia
te
s,
 a
n
d
 l
ic
en
se
es
, 
bu
t 
h
as
 p
er
io
d
ic
al
ly
 c
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 
se
le
ct
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s,
 n
am
el
y 
ce
n
tr
al
iz
in
g
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
to
 i
m
p
ro
v
e 
re
co
rd
 k
ee
p
in
g
, 
an
d 
d
ev
el
op
in
g
 a
 s
et
 o
f 
co
m
m
on
 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
to
 r
es
to
re
 p
ro
g
ra
m
m
at
ic
 o
rd
er
.
N
FT
E
Ju
m
p
st
ar
t 
b
eg
an
 w
it
h
 a
 l
oo
se
 b
ra
n
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
, 
b
u
t 
th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
f
su
p
p
or
ti
n
g
, 
op
er
at
in
g
, 
an
d
 f
u
n
d
in
g 
si
te
s 
b
ec
am
e 
u
n
m
an
ag
ea
b
le
 a
s 
th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 g
re
w
. 
In
 1
9
9
9
, 
Ju
m
p
st
ar
t 
tr
an
si
ti
on
ed
 t
o 
h
a
vi
n
g 
co
lle
g
es
 a
n
d 
u
n
iv
er
si
ti
es
 l
ic
en
se
 
it
s 
pr
og
ra
m
, 
le
v
er
ag
in
g 
th
e 
ed
u
ca
ti
on
al
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
on
s’
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 a
n
d 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 t
o 
sp
ee
d
 g
ro
w
th
.
Ju
m
p
st
a
rt
E
ar
th
 F
or
ce
’s
 n
et
w
or
k 
in
cl
u
d
es
 a
 m
ix
 o
f 
b
ra
n
ch
es
, 
lic
en
se
es
, 
an
d
 o
n
e 
af
fi
lia
te
. 
Th
e 
or
g
an
iz
at
io
n
 in
it
ia
lly
 m
an
ag
ed
 i
ts
 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 m
od
el
 t
ig
h
tl
y,
 b
u
t 
lo
os
en
ed
 t
h
e 
re
ig
n
s 
p
er
 s
it
e 
re
qu
es
ts
to
 t
ai
lo
r 
th
e 
m
od
el
 t
o 
lo
ca
l 
n
ee
d
s.
 N
at
io
n
al
 i
s 
re
cl
ai
m
in
g
 a
 p
or
ti
on
 o
f 
it
s 
ol
d 
co
n
tr
ol
, 
h
ow
ev
er
, 
a
ft
er
 b
ei
n
g 
u
n
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 o
f 
so
m
e 
p
ro
g
ra
m
s.
E
a
rt
h
 F
o
rc
e
C
ol
le
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
 s
ta
rt
ed
 a
s 
a 
ti
g
h
tl
y 
co
n
tr
ol
le
d 
br
an
ch
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
w
it
h
 m
os
t 
of
 i
ts
 b
ac
k-
of
fi
ce
 i
n
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
m
ai
n
ta
in
ed
 f
ro
m
 h
ea
d
qu
ar
te
rs
. 
T
o 
lig
h
te
n
 t
h
e 
lo
a
d
 o
n
 n
at
io
n
a
l 
a
n
d 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
of
fi
ce
s 
m
or
e 
d
is
cr
et
io
n
, 
C
ol
le
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
 h
as
 b
eg
u
n
 s
h
if
ti
n
g
 s
om
e 
re
sp
on
si
b
ili
ti
es
 (
su
ch
 a
s 
fi
n
di
n
g
lo
ca
l 
of
fi
ce
 s
p
ac
e)
 d
ow
n
 t
o 
th
e 
si
te
 l
ev
el
.
C
o
lle
g
e 
S
u
m
m
it
C
it
iz
en
 S
ch
oo
ls
 l
ic
en
se
s 
it
s 
p
ro
g
ra
m
 t
o 
co
m
m
u
n
it
y-
b
as
ed
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s 
an
d 
sc
h
oo
l 
di
st
ri
ct
s 
an
d 
p
ro
vi
d
es
 t
h
em
 w
it
h
 
on
-g
oi
n
g
 t
ra
in
in
g
, 
cu
rr
ic
u
lu
m
, 
an
d 
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 s
u
p
p
or
t.
 W
h
ile
 t
h
e 
in
it
ia
l 
p
la
n
 w
as
 t
o 
h
av
e 
lo
os
e 
g
u
id
el
in
es
, 
se
ve
ra
l 
lic
en
se
es
 a
sk
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For example, YouthBuild USA founder and president Dorothy Stoneman wanted to 
spark a national movement, not build a national organization, so “we started by giving 
everything away—our knowledge and our name.” YouthBuild USA provided a 
handbook, inspirational training, and on-site technical assistance coupled with full local 
autonomy with no contractual affiliation agreement for use of the YouthBuild name. 
When federal funds were appropriated for the program, however, the first 15 sites sat 
her down and asked for protection from opportunists seeking funds from HUD who 
might undermine YouthBuild’s reputation by not adhering to the philosophy and 
program design. As a result, YouthBuild USA and these directors created standards for 
affiliation and use of the brand name, and further codified the program in a series of 
five handbooks. Initially, Citizen Schools also contemplated a relatively loose structure, 
but the model evolved to a more tightly managed affiliate system. Summer Search has 
begun looking for ways to minimize back office costs by centralizing certain functions 
that historically have been handled by individual sites.   
The organizations that sought to devolve responsibility from the national office to the 
branches were motivated primarily by the difficulty of attracting sufficient funding and/or 
talented staff for all the sites. For example, Posse began delegating control so that site 
directors could run their own operations with greater autonomy. As founder and 
president Deborah Bial noted, “We can’t continue to raise the money [for all five 
branches] through one [national] office. It’s not healthy or smart. We’d like to give the 
program directors more power, more like executive directors, so they’re managing the 
office, raising the budget themselves.” The local directors will oversee local training, 
fundraising, and staff development, while the national office will retain oversight over 
training, finance, communications, university relationships, and local advisory boards.  
Although there isn’t likely to be one best way to structure a national organization, 
making the wrong choice did place some of the organizations in jeopardy. The 
experience of Public Allies, for instance, made clear the importance of matching 
decision-making with fiscal responsibility. Within 10 years of its launch, Public Allies 
was operating branches in more than 10 cities and had financial and legal obligations 
for all that went on in these sites. Without the proper controls or staff in place, site 
directors began making decisions (such as leasing real estate and adding major 
program pieces) that had implications for the entire network, without consulting the 
national office.  
 19
Reflecting on what had happened, executive director Paul Schmitz pointed out some of 
the subsequent challenges. “There is minimal accountability for local site directors, 
because the national will always have ultimate responsibility for bailing local sites out. 
Replacing a poorly performing director is also very expensive, because it means there 
is no one raising money locally for several months and a new director takes time to 
build relationships.” Ultimately, Schmitz came to the realization that, “The structure we 
have is dysfunctional. The home office has all of the responsibility and little control. We 
either have to centralize more decisions, which goes against the culture of leadership 
development, or decentralize the structure and put liability where decisions are made. 
There are tradeoffs either way." In fact, in the time since our initial interviews, Public 
Allies has decided that all of the sites must affiliate with local organizations or 
universities in their communities.  
Financial Consequences of Growth 
Growth increases an organization’s need for capital at the same time that it increases 
its potential to achieve impact. As a result, it can be a double-edged sword, because 
greater ease in attracting new funds is seldom its reward. On the contrary, since capital 
is seldom allocated rationally in the nonprofit sector, successful growth usually makes 
the organization’s (and its leader’s) financial burden heavier, not lighter.    
Observation 3: The financial condition of these organizations, even the 
best-known and fastest-growing, was remarkably fragile.   
The organizations in this study are among the best known in the field of youth services. 
They take in average annual revenues of $7.3 million, and they have been in operation 
for an average of 26 years. Yet the degree to which they live on the edge financially 
might well stop for-profit executives dead in their tracks. Consider a few statistics: 
among the 16 organizations that provided data on this question, the average operating 
reserve was four-and-a-half months, and eight had two-month reserves or less. None 
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had more than nine months of operating expenses on hand. Additionally, two-thirds of 
the organizations experienced at least one year of declining revenue between 1999 
and 2003, and one-quarter dipped twice (Exhibit 5).6 Over this same period, 50 percent 
laid off staff, 60 percent shifted to a lower-cost program model, and 45 percent cut 
entire programs (Exhibit 6). 
Exhibit 5: Operating revenue dips over time for organizations studied
5
6
6
No dips
One dip
Two or
more
dips
Organization in study, segmented by:
Number of year-over-year declines in operating revenue   
(1999-2003)
Source: Data provided by participating organizations
 
                                                     
6 We recognize that this period included both the boom and the bust of the so-called Internet 
economy. 
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Exhibit 6: Financial tough times prompted several of the organizations 
to take drastic actions
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Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
The challenges facing Nancy Wachs, the executive director of After School Matters, 
are representative. The organization has strong support from the city of Chicago and 
its partners, and its programs are not currently in jeopardy. But the demand for its 
programs is huge, and funding has not kept pace: “We have a lot of support, but it is 
not always smooth. The city has been pushing us to grow faster, and they are helpful, 
but it is not always enough. And right now the parks have a big deficit, and the schools 
are having budgetary problems. Our programs are not in jeopardy, but the system is a 
bit precarious… To think that we would have to retreat from some of these schools 
makes me sick to my stomach. This program is a lifeline for a lot of these kids.” 
Several organizations in the study have experienced the kind of drastic dips in funding 
that Wachs worries about. Communities In Schools of Atlanta nearly collapsed in the 
late 1990s, when they were unwilling to bid on operating a single-campus alternative 
school for 1,000 students rather than the small, dispersed sites of 150 students or less 
that they had previously operated. “There was a big layoff, a big reduction in staff,” said 
Theresa Crawford, director of finance and administration. “The remaining staff was 
scared, nobody knew what was going to happen.”  
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More recently, shifts in the prevailing political winds created enormous problems for all 
the organizations that relied on AmeriCorps appropriations. The East Bay Conservation 
Corps, which lost a $3-million grant in the early 2000s, cut staff, trimmed benefits, and 
did away with raises in order to preserve the number of students and youth 
participating in their programs. But even though they had planned for the possibility of 
the cut, morale plummeted, the level of uncertainty among the staff soared, and neither 
had stabilized at the time of our interviews. As Janice Jensen, the former COO, put it, 
“We’ve been getting hit from every corner… in large part because of AmeriCorps, but 
also because of the continued downturn in the economy, and the fact that many of our 
other funding sources have not been coming through for us.”  
Financial crises were sometimes precipitated by the loss, or simply the delay, of funds 
from private sources. Earth Force, for example, was funded in full until 1998 by the 
Pew Charitable Trust, which had founded the organization in 1991. As Pew began to 
phase out its contribution, Earth Force was able to compensate for the lost funds; but 
its revenue growth rate slowed. Jumpstart’s white-knuckle ride occurred during the 
leadership transition from founder Aaron Lieberman to Rob Waldron, now the 
organization’s president and CEO. Despite the demonstrable success Jumpstart was 
having with its pre-school “scholars,” the organization was perhaps three months from 
insolvency, because funders were taking a wait-and-see approach to the leadership 
transition. As then board chair Jeff Bradach put it, “I don’t know what would have 
happened if Rob had said ‘no.’”  
Salvation in times like these sometimes arrived in the form of a funder or a small set of 
funders willing to provide the resources necessary for survival. When Public Allies 
experienced a financial crisis in 2000, a board member stepped in to help cover debts 
incurred as the national office absorbed local sites’ deficits. “We were moving payroll to 
payroll in this period,” executive director Paul Schmitz remembered, and “we [had] cut 
through to the bone.” At Jumpstart, the board searched for and ultimately identified a 
foundation willing to provide an essential and immediate infusion of funds during the 
transition. YouthBuild USA also has received funding in times of near-desperation from 
foundations that had been long-time supporters. The board of Communities In Schools 
of Atlanta played a similarly crucial role by stepping in to raise emergency money from 
donors who had supported the organization historically. 
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Observation 4: Economies of scale and experience were evident for some 
of the organizations in the study but not for others.   
Growth in the for-profit sector is often motivated by the potential to achieve economies 
of scale (the ability to share indirect costs over more products) and/or economies of 
experience (the ability to turn out products at a lower unit cost over time thanks to 
“smarter” production practices). The ability to realize these economic effects has long 
been a critical success factor in manufacturing; and it is becoming increasingly 
important for many for-profit service providers as well.  
Whether nonprofit organizations have the potential to achieve similar economic gains 
without eroding their missions is an unanswered—and hotly debated—question. At the 
meeting in New York, this finding generated more discussion than any other, with 
compelling arguments offered on both sides of the question. The data from the study 
do not resolve the issue. Of the 10 organizations that were able to give us detailed and 
consistent cost breakdowns over time, two saw their cost per youth decline between 
1999 and 2003; three saw a decline towards the end of the period; and five saw no 
general trend downward. (Exhibit 7 shows an example of each of these three 
archetypes.)  
The interview data and the discussion among the participants at the New York meeting 
point to several phenomena that may explain why the majority of these organizations 
have not realized significant and consistent economies of scale and/or experience. 
• Because several participants were still modifying or adapting their programs, 
neither their program costs nor their overhead costs were stable over time. 
Organizations such as Communities In Schools of Atlanta, which recently shifted 
from operating its own academies to working in the public schools, provided the 
most dramatic examples of this kind of programmatic change.  
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Exhibit 7: The degree to which the organizations were able to achieve 
economies of scale and/or experience varied
Note: The above three examples are organizations with only one dedicated program offering; Organizations have been disguised 
(data has been indexed to 1 in 1998); Metric is total annual operating cost divided by total number of youth served; Data has been 
adjusted for inflation; 2004 data was not available for the “Emerging” example.
Source: Data provided by participating organizations
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The need to bring in more professional staff was widespread among the 
organizations, increasing their cost base and potentially offsetting any efficiency 
gains achieved in other areas. Fulfillment Fund and Larkin Street were among 
the organizations that had to bring in more seasoned (and more expensive) staff 
than the generalists and volunteers with whom they had begun their operations.  
• 
• Many of the organizations chose (implicitly if not explicitly) to increase the quality 
of their programs rather than pursue efficiency gains. These changes included 
investing in staff training, instituting processes for cross-site communication and 
sharing best practices, codifying and rounding out programs to better serve 
participants’ needs, and instituting and tracking performance metrics. (Exhibit 8 
shows the range of activities organizations in the study took to maintain program 
quality while they grew.)  
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Exhibit 8: The organizations studied took a variety of actions to 
control and/or improve quality while they grew
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Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
 
Extremely high turnover rates and operating inefficiencies could be hard to 
eliminate for reasons largely outside the organizations’ control. For example, 
Girls Incorporated of Alameda County loses 80 percent of its part-time program 
staff every year, because its youthful employees tend to become overwhelmed by 
the magnitude of the issues facing their young clients. Jumpstart recruits college 
students, paid through work-study and/or AmeriCorps funds, to tutor 
disadvantaged pre-school children. From an economic perspective, the value of 
recruiting as many tutors as possible from a single university is unarguable. In 
practice, politics trumped economics, however, because of AmeriCorps rules 
about how many students can participate per campus. (That said, Jumpstart is 
one of the organizations that has successfully driven its cost per student down, 
by carefully codifying its operating systems and programs.)  
• 
It may be the case that in the next five years, more of the organizations in the study will 
experience significant reductions in their cost per youth. As we will see hereafter, many 
of them were investing significantly to build their capability; these investments—and 
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the increased overhead costs they give rise to—could easily have dwarfed any savings 
achieved from scale or experience in the short-term. The fact that several 
organizations saw accelerating declines in their cost per youth toward the end of the 
period under study provides some evidence for this hypothesis.7 Nevertheless, given 
the other issues highlighted above (i.e., program modifications, turnover, external 
forces, the pursuit of quality), continuing to question whether every youth-serving 
organization could, or even should, achieve economies of scale or experience effects 
comparable to those of corporations appears to be warranted.  
Organizational Consequences of Growth  
The need to professionalize staff and systems as the organization grew was a 
recurring theme in this study. Almost without exception, each participating organization 
reached a point where passionate commitment—and sheer will—from the leader and 
key staff were no longer sufficient to allow it to continue functioning well. Significant 
changes in processes, procedures, and roles were required, not only on the part of the 
leader and staff, but also on the part of the board.  
Amid all this change, one thing did remain constant, however: the burden of 
fundraising borne by the leader. Whatever the capacity of the organization’s 
development staff, donors expected to maintain a personal relationship with the leader.     
Observation 5: Bringing in a chief operating officer was often essential, 
yet just as often proved challenging for the organization’s leader as well 
as for the staff.    
                                                     
7 There is also an absence of mechanisms in the nonprofit sector that might reinforce the search for 
economic efficiencies. For example, the pressure that is routinely brought to bear on for-profit 
companies by financial analysts and the capital markets has no analogue in the nonprofit world. 
Data are hard to come by and notoriously inexact. Funders have yet to show much interest in 
supporting nonprofits’ efforts to scale effective programs rather than innovating and inventing new 
ones.  
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The organizations in the study commonly found that as they grew, the demands of 
daily operations coupled with the need to communicate constantly with the board, the 
public, funders, and key partners, overwhelmed the capacity of even the most tireless 
leaders. Staff began to observe bottlenecks, with day-to-day operating decisions 
getting held up because only the executive director or CEO could make them. Joanna 
Lennon, the founder and CEO of The East Bay Conservation Corps, offered an 
analogy to plugging holes in a dike with all her fingers and toes, with the rising tide 
eventually overwhelming her capacity to hold the water at bay.  
Bringing in a chief operating officer or, alternatively, delegating COO-like 
responsibilities to a senior staff member, constituted a direct response to the 
complexity that comes with growth. (As Exhibit 9 shows, the addition of a COO is a 
relatively recent phenomenon for many of these organizations.) 
Exhibit 9: Adding chief operating officers is a relatively recent 
phenomenon 
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In talking about the contributions of their COOs, many participants in the study noted 
the implementation skills they brought with them and their ability to impose order on a 
disorderly world. When the pairing worked well, the COO could provide a balance to 
the visionary drive of the leader, producing the combination of inspiration and 
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implementation that the organization needed to succeed. As J.B. Schramm, founder 
and CEO of College Summit, put it, in retrospect he would have “hired his opposite” 
three years earlier than he did. 
COOs were instrumental in rationalizing programs and thinking about how to get the 
most impact from the leanest operations. They also had the energy to devote to critical 
internal functions, such as financial management, monitoring performance, and hiring 
and training staff, which many stretched-thin leaders had not previously been able to 
address. Perhaps the most important function the COO fulfilled, however, was freeing 
the leader from daily operations, so that he or she could fulfill the roles which only they 
could perform, chief among them fundraising and developing—and maintaining—
strong board and external relationships.   
In order to benefit from a COO’s skills, the organization had to get over the hurdles of 
finding the right person and integrating the role. Most of the participants agreed that it 
was difficult to find the right person for this critical position, and some failed in their 
attempts the first time around. Several described the dilemma they faced looking for a 
person with the right management and operational skills who could also fit into the 
culture. Both Geoff Canada (president and CEO of Harlem Children Zone) and Steve 
Mariotti (founder and president of NFTE) expressed regret about overriding initial 
concerns that a key manager or COO hire would not be a good cultural fit. NFTE 
eventually experienced success with a COO with years of corporate experience and 
the right personality for the job; Harlem Children’s Zone, and also YouthBuild USA, 
reached inside for the right candidate, and gained the advantage of someone with 
deep knowledge of the programs and credibility with other staff. Given the cost of 
having a COO fail, which often included losing valued staff, these leaders emphasized 
the value of building in backstops and erring on the side of over-communicating when 
a new senior manager signs on.  
Clarifying the COO role and explicitly dividing responsibilities between the leader and 
COO could also be a substantial challenge. Many leaders were not only accustomed to 
being enmeshed in the organizations’ daily work but also had strong relationships with 
existing staff who were now being asked to report to someone else. Yielding these 
roles and relationships tended to be hard for everyone. Asked about the devolution of 
decision-making at Harlem Children’s Zone, Canada said simply, “People’s reactions 
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were what I thought—they hated it.” The fact that the COO’s position was often 
introduced in concert with new organizational controls, such as measurement metrics 
and financial management systems, only increased the likelihood that he or she would 
serve as a kind of lightning rod for resistance to change.   
The leaders and COOs we met with identified trust, communication, and ground rules 
for the roles each would play as critical ingredients for success. As Mia Roberts, COO 
of Big Sister Association of Greater Boston, observed, “You must be patient… to build 
trust. People want to… know that you are meeting expectations and that you can 
deliver and deliver consistently.” In order to allow COOs to “deliver,” however, the 
leaders had to invest the COO’s role with credibility by visibly yielding decision-making 
power. “The thing I can’t pay Steve [Mariotti, president and founder] and Mike [Caslin, 
executive director and CEO] enough respect for,” said Dave Nelson, NFTE’s COO, “is 
they said, ‘Dave, here are the keys to the car. Just get us where we need to go safely.’” 
Identifying and agreeing on signs to assess how the transition was going helped 
several organizations negotiate it successfully. For example, both Harlem Children’s 
Zone and Big Sister Association of Greater Boston tested the waters by using what 
their leaders called the “line test”: how many people were lined up in front of the COO’s 
door instead of the leader’s. Cognizant of how important the relationships that pre-
existed her were, Big Sister Association of Greater Boston COO Mia Roberts 
commented, “I couldn’t just tell everyone to stop going to Jerry [Martinson]’s [the 
executive director’s] office. You have to earn people’s respect. Jerry and I agreed that I 
would not interrupt relationships in a hierarchical way… If people started coming to my 
door we would know that our job was done.” 
Observation 6: The complexity caused by growth gave rise to the need 
for formal systems and staff with more specialized skills. These, in turn, 
tended to create internal stress as well as a more professional 
organization.   
To sustain growth, the organizations had to fill a number of management roles besides 
the COO. They also had to upgrade their systems as defined not only by the 
technology infrastructure but also by operating policies and procedures that would 
allow them to work more efficiently and insure them against liabilities (especially in the 
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areas of human resources and finance). James Cleveland, COO of Jumpstart, noted 
that when he came, “For the most part, Jumpstart had people doing more than they 
were capable of. We had to simplify. There were systems that had been in place for 
years that were easy to use if you were managing two sites, but impossible if you were 
managing eight sites, because you just didn’t have the time.” 
The predictability of the specialized knowledge and functional skills a growing 
organization requires did not make them a whit less crucial. Consider human 
resources. Hiring was a critically important task in these organizations, given that they 
were working with youth and were responsible for their safety and well-being. It was 
also an ongoing process, so hiring (and training) practices needed to be efficient as 
well as effective. Performance reviews, compensation, and promotion policies also 
became higher priorities, especially as the organizations increased the number of high-
level positions. All this translated into a list of what Youth In Need’s president and CEO 
Jim Braun calls “nuts and bolts” functions, such as an HR database; pay and benefit 
consistency; recruiting and hiring; background, credential, and licensing checks; and 
exit interviews.   
Finance was another “invisible” function the organizations needed to upgrade, by 
adding more sophisticated financial managers and management systems. Similarly 
with development, adding staff with specialized skills and knowledge was one of the 
ways in which the organizations met the challenge of increasing and diversifying their 
sources of funding as they grew. Big Sister Association of Greater Boston hired a 
development director to rejuvenate board-giving and initiate an individual giving 
campaign, for example, while Public Allies hired a government relations person as it 
began to rely increasingly on money from AmeriCorps. 
Good information technology was a necessary, and often under-funded, complement to 
all these functions. It was also essential for monitoring and improving performance. 
Public Allies offers an example of how technology, above and beyond the basics, can 
advance an organization’s mission. Its system for tracking participants and participant 
outcomes has been invaluable in producing transparent data across sites and 
efficiently satisfying the data needs of the organization’s management and different 
types of funders. This kind of system, considered a luxury by many nonprofits, is 
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increasingly a necessity and becoming more affordable for rapidly growing 
organizations. 
From the perspective of existing staff, the increased professionalism that accompanied 
growth could be a plus or a minus. On the one hand, growth could help to curb staff 
turnover and develop new leaders. Turnover for several of the organizations was a 
constant challenge. Given the intensity of the work and the typically low pay, young 
people made attractive hires. The same reasons—coupled with life-stage events and 
general mobility—sometimes led to situations in which employees routinely departed 
after one or two years.  
For many of these organizations, growth created the need for new, more responsible 
middle-management jobs. Big Sister Association of Greater Boston described the 
process: “We needed to introduce a middle layer, and we also needed to develop 
talent. Two of our managers now were internally grown. They started as social workers 
six years ago. We developed that talent so they could stay here. We now have an 
explicit training program.”  
Organizations with a national presence had the added benefit of offering multiple 
geographies within which its employees could work. As talented staff progressed, they 
could recruit (and groom) new staff to fill more junior positions. Summer Search 
focuses on attracting talented young people and giving them leadership opportunities. 
Citizen Schools explained that, “It’s easy to dissipate the core as you grow, but we 
decided to reinvest in [it]. This has allowed us to keep great people and attract great 
people.”   
On the other hand, these organizational changes could also take a high toll on existing 
staff. Some employees were not willing to stay with the organizations as they became 
more standardized and structured. Often there was a disconnect between senior 
management’s interest in growth and others’ interest in maintaining the current size. As 
one founder commented, “though everyone [in the organization] is imbued with the 
mission, they are not imbued with the growth plan.” 
Change could be especially painful when existing employees did not have the skills 
and capabilities required to meet the organization’s evolving needs. Several 
participants talked about the difficulty of finding new roles for such individuals and the 
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hard task of transitioning out champions who were among the longest serving and 
most loyal members of the staff. They also discussed the challenges they had faced in 
developing the managerial skills required to guide larger, more complex organizations. 
In one instance, the board had provided formal coaching for its executive director as 
well as access to an executive education program. In other cases, helpful advice and 
informal coaching came from individual board members or trusted consultants.  
At times, however, growth ultimately did require the leader to change roles, relinquish 
control, or even leave. When the leader was also the founder, this transition could be 
especially difficult; but if the organization handled it gracefully it could also set a 
powerful example. Linda Mornell, founder of Summer Search, says, “It’s one of the 
things I’m proudest of as a founder—I’ve let go.” Jumpstart also had a solid method for 
transitioning the founder. According to former Jumpstart board chair Jeff Bradach, “The 
thing that’s remarkable is that [the founder] genuinely stepped away and created space 
for [the new CEO]. And [the CEO] very smartly would engage [the founder].” However, 
other organizations struggled through this transition. One founder commented, “There 
are times in the last year when I’ve asked myself if I should step down.” And though it 
is not an easy conversation to have, within many organizations staff spoke about both 
their pride in what the founders had created and their worry that these same people 
might not be the right ones to manage the organizations in their larger states.  
Observation 7: Growth almost always required redefining the role of the 
board and its members.     
Growth often affected the boards of these organizations as profoundly as it did the 
staff. At virtually all of these organizations the board was moving (or had already 
moved) away from a hands-on programmatic role to one that emphasized fundraising 
and governance. (Exhibit 10 shows the initiatives these leaders expect their boards will 
be most engaged with over the next five years.)  
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Exhibit 10: Nearly 90 percent of the organizations studied cited
adding board members with access to financial resources as a priority
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At times, these transitions required changes in the board’s membership as well as its 
responsibilities. Managing these changes gracefully was challenging (and time-
consuming) for everyone concerned—especially the leader. One of the keys was to be 
transparent about the expectations for new members and the value they could bring. 
For example, when NFTE founder and president Steve Mariotti looked at the ability of 
successful fundraising nonprofits like universities, it became clear to him that capital 
was critical to NFTE’s plan to reach more students: “During Harvard’s campaign, Neil 
Rudenstein raised $2 million per day. Capital per kid is what matters.” Mariotti 
envisioned a capital campaign that would allow all the organization’s overhead 
expenses to be paid for, so that any additional funding would go directly to program 
expenses, and set out to recruit new board members. Mariotti tried a novel approach to 
impress upon the prospective board members how much NFTE would value their time 
and energy: “I went out to recruit the ‘Seven Samurai’ for our board, and I said to them, 
‘We’re getting ready for you. We’re not ready yet. But we’re getting ready, and in a 
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year, I will be back.’” Mariotti returned over the next several years, all the recruits 
accepted, and NFTE’s capital campaign is successfully underway. 
Not all of the organizations experienced radical board change. Some boards went 
through incremental changes, which included explicit conversations with members 
about new and more ambitious fundraising expectations as well as wider roles in fiscal 
oversight and periodic strategy reviews. Big Sister Association of Greater Boston, for 
example, asked board members to double their financial commitments and give early 
in the year to help with financial planning and to inspire others to give. The board, 
which supported Big Sister’s goal of reaching more girls, responded affirmatively. 
The Steppingstone Foundation and The East Bay Conservation Corps offer examples 
of the value that can come from evolving the role of the board. Both organizations 
began with boards of friends, people who supported the founders personally, as well as 
what they were trying to do. The EBCC board actually underwent two transformations: 
first to a group of influential people who lent their names more than their time or 
money, and then to a board that was more involved, especially in fundraising. At 
Steppingstone, the transition was more subtle. The shift in the role of the board was 
due to a new chair, the first board member whose introduction to the organization was 
not as a friend or acquaintance of founder Michael Danziger, but via his own passion 
for the issues Steppingstone addresses.  As a result, the board has begun to impose 
more discipline on itself, creating more task-specific committees and roles, and to 
demand more accountability from Steppingstone as well. Both founders, Joanna 
Lennon and Michael Danziger, agree that the additional discipline has been positive for 
their organizations, and a welcome balance to their own passions and opinions. 
The Chutes and Ladders of Growth 
Our last observations focus on several factors that appear to have aided or impeded 
growth. The three that came up most often in the interviews were the influence of 
foundations, the importance of performance measurement, and the scarcity of funds 
for investments in infrastructure.  
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Observation 8: Foundation funds could propel growth, but they were 
unlikely to sustain it. 
Foundations played a variety of roles in the growth of the organizations in this study. 
(Exhibit 11 shows the kinds of assistance leaders of organizations that receive 
foundation support found most helpful.) The most common, and most important, roles 
were propelling early growth and providing general operating support. Citizen Schools, 
College Summit, Earth Force, and Public Allies relied heavily (if not exclusively) on 
foundations for their initial growth. The EBCC, Harlem Children’s Zone, and YouthBuild 
USA received foundation funds at critical junctures in their organizational lives.  
In a 2003 study of the funding mix of 40 youth-serving organizations, Bridgespan found 
that foundation funding, on average, fell from roughly 40 percent of total revenue, when 
a youth-serving organization was under $1 million in size, to less than 20 percent, 
when it was in the $3-to-10-million range. (See Exhibit 12.) While the organizations in 
the study conformed to this general pattern (see Exhibit 13), several (including College 
Summit, Posse, Citizen Schools, NFTE, and Harlem Children’s Zone) received a 
significantly higher proportion of overall funding from foundations than is customary for 
organizations of comparable size. For example, Citizen Schools, which has an overall 
budget of just under $7 million, receives more than 50 percent of its funding from 
foundations, while roughly one-third of NFTE’s nearly $9 million comes from foundation 
funders.   
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Exhibit 11: The organizations that relied at least in part on foundation 
support identified several helpful roles foundations played 
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Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
Exhibit 12: In a 2003 study, Bridgespan mapped the average funding 
mix of youth-serving organizations by organization size
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Exhibit 13: Several of the organizations studied relied on foundation 
funding more heavily than is customary for organizations of 
comparable size
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Crucial as this support was, the leaders of these organizations also recognized the 
importance of building a more diverse revenue base. Citizen Schools’ president and 
co-founder Eric Schwarz has been working for several years to identify new supporters 
who can help cover the added costs of new sites. “For individuals you have to invest in 
the cultivation of people. Building a strong board and staff is key to raising more money 
from individuals. For the public sector, you need a talented person who can write great 
grants and do great research. You also need someone who can network. In the 
corporate world, a different type of networking is important. Conferences help build 
respect. There is no silver bullet. We aim to build a range of revenue flows, each of 
which covers 10 percent to 15 percent of the budget.” 
Schwarz was not alone in targeting individual donors as a potential source of increased 
funding. Every organization in the study expects to increase the percentage of its 
revenue coming from individuals over the next five years. (See Exhibit 14.) One of the 
primary reasons cited for this emphasis is the data that suggest a massive transfer of 
wealth to the sector in the future. Among the steps these organizations are taking to try 
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to tap this pool are increased hiring of development staff and recruiting heavy hitters 
onto their boards. How successful these efforts will be remains to be seen.   
Exhibit 14: Nearly all of the  organizations studied are banking on 
increasing funding from individuals
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Observation 9: These organizations believe codification was essential in 
enabling them to expand without sacrificing quality.  
Study participants struggled with questions about how much variation and program 
experimentation was healthy and at what point it impinged on the results they were 
trying to achieve. Ultimately, however, all of the organizations found that in order to 
expand successfully, they needed some degree of program codification. A number of 
factors drove in the direction of codification. One was the desire to ensure that the 
organization continued to have the same impact on all its participants. Another was a 
sense of responsibility to colleagues, to share wisdom gained from experience. 
Dorothy Stoneman, YouthBuild USA founder and president, pointed out that, “It doesn’t 
work to just throw an idea at local organizations. We know so much about how to do it; 
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our role is to tell them what we know to date about how to implement it effectively. 
Then they can build on what we’ve learned and do it even better.”  
For some organizations, like Posse, which aims to change diversity and leadership on 
college campuses, altering the way that the world around them thinks or operates is 
core to their mission. As a result, fostering a consistent culture in new locations is as 
important to the success of their programs as codifying the procedures that make 
these programs work. Posse focused on documentation from the outset, creating its 
first program manual to codify the work of the original New York site before the second 
site even opened. Equally important, it developed extensive training and acculturation 
processes, and stipulated elements (such as the appearance of the site) to reinforce 
the culture and common values.  
The appropriate degree of codification and adherence to specific processes for an 
organization depended on its objectives. For example, Communities In Schools of 
Atlanta’s priority is using community resources to improve students’ lives. Therefore, 
they were more concerned with specifying the outcomes of their program than with 
specifying the program strategies per se, which had to be able to accommodate each 
school’s needs, students, and community dynamics. As executive director Patty Pflum 
observed, “There is no single manual for going into communities and helping them 
improve their schools. The key is to find out where the obstacles are and where the 
resources are.” The balance to this flexibility is provided by the field supervisors, who 
ensure that every school has a site plan (developed by the program person with the 
school’s principal) with clearly identified benchmarks.  
Whatever the form codification took, it represented a significant investment of time and 
energy on the part of the organization. Further, it was not something that could be done 
once, put on a shelf, and then simply taken down from time to time. If manuals or 
processes were to be effective, they had to be revisited in light of local conditions and 
innovations in the field. For example, Posse hired two people to write its original 
program manual and is in the process of revising it today. 
The process of codification went hand-in-hand with evaluation. Ensuring that a 
program is making a difference to its participants was the most compelling reason to 
measure outcomes. But measurement filled other functions as well, including 
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establishing credibility with funders and allowing the organization to monitor outcomes 
and therefore establish arms-length accountability.  
Observation 10: The later an organization made performance 
measurement part of its culture, the more disruptive the process was.    
All the organizations were collecting some sort of performance data. However, the 
sophistication of the data and the degree to which the use of data had been 
internalized and incorporated into decision-making varied considerably. For example, 
the level of confidence among the participants that they had reliable data about their 
organizations’ financial performance was high. But only half as many participants were 
equally confident they had the data they needed to know whether their programs were 
achieving the desired outcomes. (See Exhibit 15.)       
Exhibit 15: Surveyed leaders tended to be less satisfied with their 
program outcome data than with financial performance data
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organization’s performance measurement efforts today. 
Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
The influence of funders in getting people focused on performance measurement was 
unmistakable. Even if it is not yet true that, as one leader stated, “Every funder is 
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looking for evaluations and outcomes,” the perception that this is the case was widely 
shared. As Michael Danziger, president and founder of The Steppingstone Foundation, 
commented, the “anecdotal stuff” is not compelling. Jerry Martinson, the executive 
director of Big Sister Association of Greater Boston, reported that, “Every funder is 
looking for evaluations and outcomes… People want to know what difference did [a 
program] make, what impact did it have? To be able to take a proven validation, [to 
show] that it works is extremely useful… It shapes how we do business and it shapes 
how we talk to people.” These examples could be repeated for almost every one of the 
organizations. 
The organizations in this study appear, on balance, to have established a higher level 
of proof of outcomes than the average. David Hunter of the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation has developed a continuum that can be used to assess the level of 
evidence an organization has for the effectiveness of its program or programs: 
apparent effectiveness, demonstrated effectiveness, and proven effectiveness. (See 
Exhibit 16.) Hunter reports that “most youth development service providers offer 
programs that fall somewhere in the range of ‘apparent effectiveness.’”8 Of the 20 
organizations in the study, 13 report practices that would put them at the high end of 
apparent effectiveness, six can be categorized under demonstrated effectiveness, and 
one has met the lower end of the proven effectiveness criteria.      
Several of the leaders expressed regret that they had not begun collecting and 
aggregating performance data earlier in their organizations’ existence. One, looking 
back, offered the following advice: “Set your priorities and start accumulating data for 
your outcomes.” At the same time, the most valuable aspect of collecting performance 
data for this leader (as for others) was the insight it provided for the organization. “The 
true value of who we are really started [to become apparent] when we could track who 
the kids are and where they were going.”  
                                                     
8  Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, Guide to Assessing Youth Development Program Quality and 
Effectiveness. 
 42
Exhibit 16: Continuum of program effectiveness
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As this comment indicates, the value of collecting and monitoring performance data 
sooner rather than later in an organization’s life went well beyond having the capacity 
to respond to funders’ requests. A number of organizations, including Earth Force, 
Jumpstart, and The Steppingstone Foundation, introduced performance measurement 
so early that it seemed to be part of their DNA. As a result, they not only had measures 
“before anyone else was asking for them,” in the words of Steppingstone’s Danziger, 
but also seemed to have an easier time integrating data into their decision-making as 
the organization grew.  
When Jumpstart began implementing a new regional management structure, for 
example, program directors caught on remarkably quickly to the idea that, in Rob 
Waldron’s words, “You can’t manage remotely unless you have information in front of 
you, and using indicators to really drive decisions [is] key to your success.” Jumpstart’s 
leadership also realized that the risk of moving to a less tightly controlled—and faster-
growing—network wasn’t going to be an issue when they saw performance data 
indicating that affiliates were out-performing company-owned sites.          
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In contrast, organizations that came late to performance measurement tended to find it 
organizationally taxing and at times divisive. Even when management had internalized 
the value of the new practices, program staff tended to be skeptical, viewing them as 
bureaucratic at best and antithetical to delivering quality services at worst. As one 
leader told us, “These people are all passionate about the growth of the kids, and so 
they picture their work as one kid at a time… [Tracking outcomes is hard] because our 
staff really feels this as a pull away from the work that they do… They feel like it’s 
different from serving the kids.” These comments were echoed by another leader, who 
was also in the process of instituting performance measures: “Funders as well as the 
people we are serving are demanding to see the outcomes of our service. Not 
everyone who works here feels the same way about this. Shifting the mindset of 
people has not been easy.” 
Introducing data collection and performance evaluation into an organization that has 
operated without them requires significant investment, not just of money, but also of 
management time. As Harlem Children’s Zone’s Geoffrey Canada noted, “If you’re 
going to live with metrics… to get to that place takes time, much longer than we ever 
thought… I honestly had no idea.” Building internal evaluation capacity by working with 
program staff and aligning it with their needs was one successful approach. For 
example, Earth Force has a full-time director of education who works with the sites and 
their external evaluator, Brandeis University, in addition to his responsibilities for 
training and program design. YouthBuild USA has a staff member dedicated to data 
collection who is as much an advocate for the value of data and coach to the many 
field sites as she is an analyst.  
Nancy Wachs, the executive director of After School Matters, is very clear that the 
young organization she leads needs “more proof and fewer anecdotes.” To address 
this need, in 2003 she brought on a director of research and evaluation whose first 
project was to rebuild the organization’s existing database, so that they could track the 
kids from semester-to-semester. Now they are engaged in a strategic planning process 
to determine the outcomes data ASM will need to prove their model. Wachs realizes 
that they also need “a longitudinal study with control groups, to figure out what 
happens to kids after the program.” But she estimates that such a study would cost 
more than $1 million, and knows that “people on our board are shocked by how much 
it would cost.”  
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As Wachs’s comments indicate, finding the money to support formal evaluations was a 
challenge. Canada framed the dilemma succinctly: “If you don’t have the evaluation 
you can’t get the big money, but if you don’t have any big money you can’t do the 
evaluation.” Of the organizations whose programs have been formally evaluated, only 
two paid for the evaluations themselves, while the rest relied on foundations or 
government agencies (see Exhibit 17).  
Exhibit 17: Formal evaluations, when they occurred, were most often 
funded with foundation money
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Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
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Observation 11: Funds for building infrastructure consistently lagged the 
need for them. 
Without exception, the organizations we interviewed credited much of their success in 
sustaining growth to the addition of key positions (and the remarkable people who filled 
them) as well as to the introduction of critical systems for managing functions such as 
finance, development, human resources, and information technology. As the former 
COO of The East Bay Conservation Corps, Janice Jensen, commented, “You add the 
non-program people last, out of necessity. But in order to have strong programs, you 
eventually need strong infrastructure. Not bloated, but strong.” Funds to build this 
infrastructure consistently lagged the need for them, however. Vince Meldrum, the 
president of Earth Force, reflected the experience of his peers, when he pointed out 
that “general operating, accounting, and administration—in other words, all the 
infrastructure—is the hardest thing to get funding for.” 
The data summarized in Exhibit 18 show how the absence of funds for infrastructure 
investments adversely affected key management functions. But the strains and 
stresses this data represent cannot be conveyed by numbers alone. Consider the 
experience of Communities In Schools of Atlanta, which added 21 new people to its 
existing 14-member program staff when it took on Project GRAD in 2000, without a 
commensurate expansion of the management team. Four years later, training, systems 
and policies for integrating new staff had yet to be fully developed and codified. Almost 
60 percent of the staff had two years or less of experience with the organization. 
Similarly, according to Dawn Hutchison, vice president of marketing and development 
for Public Allies, growth often felt “like building a house before building the foundation. 
Growth was driven by demand and when funding was available for growth. However, 
you need to balance the drive for growth with the capacity needed to support new sites 
effectively. Now that we are twelve years old, we are just coming into adolescence as 
an organization with the necessary management and support systems.”  
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Exhibit 18: Lags in infrastructure investments resulted in 
organizational needs going unmet
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Organizations in the study coped with the scarcity of infrastructure funding in two 
primary ways. Those that relied heavily on government grants, which include an 
allowance for indirect costs, typically took a “build-as-you-go” approach. While such 
allowances seldom covered all the people and systems an organization needed, they 
did allow for relatively steady, incremental growth. Youth In Need, for example, did not 
begin to add essential administrative roles until 1998, when the organization began to 
participate in Head Start. President and CEO Jim Braun who was accustomed to being 
“the CFO, the HR director, calling the shots on when to get an attorney, [writing] all the 
funding reports, [and doing] all the donor development,” began by hiring a senior vice 
president of finance. He was joined in subsequent years by a human-resources staff 
person and a chief development officer; although even then, Braun recalled, “I wanted 
the donor development person for years before I was able to get it.” 
For most organizations, building infrastructure was a never-ending process of catch-
up. And more than half had to put growth on hold so that they could put essential 
personnel and systems in place. (Exhibit 19 shows the number of times organizations 
in the study had to take a break from growth to ensure the quality of their programs.)  
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Exhibit 19: More than half of the organizations studied felt compelled 
to take a break from growth along the way to ensure program quality 
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After School Matters
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Source: Bridgespan growth of youth service organizations survey of organization leaders (September 2004, N=19)
Pat Shannon’s experience at Boys & Girls Club of Greater Washington gives a taste of 
what that experience could be like. When Shannon joined the organization in 1995 as 
president and CEO, the board mandated growth in four geographic areas where there 
was a pressing need for services. But Shannon felt strongly that growth had to be put 
on hold in order to address issues that ranged from cash flow and fundraising to risk 
management, the need for key program and management hires, and—most 
importantly—the quality and consistency of the clubs. The organization paused and 
shored up its finances, procedures, systems, programs, facilities, and staff, and “now 
has a number of people in the right positions doing the right things at the right time.” 
Nevertheless, it is once again in need of “more sophisticated resources at the 
management level,” following a merger that increased the number of children served 
from 15,000 to over 35,000 annually.  
The benefits of being able to add management capacity before its absence creates a 
crisis are evident in the recent experience of Harlem Children’s Zone. Due in large part 
to funding from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, HCZ was able to fill some 
critical leadership roles in anticipation of the needs they saw close on the horizon. The 
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HCZ story illustrates the value of hiring ahead of the need. According to president and 
CEO Geoff Canada, “We were able to then grow with all the systems and stuff in place 
and people chomping at the bit. It kept us ahead of the curve.” The pace of their 
subsequent growth testifies to the value such an approach can have.   
Concluding Thoughts 
Growth is a roller coaster for every organization, whatever its tax status. But the ride 
can be especially tumultuous for leaders of nonprofits because, unlike in the for-profit 
sector, growth is seldom rewarded by greater ease in attracting new resources. As one 
of the participants in our growth study remarked, only partly in jest, “Why would you 
grow in an environment that just creates more risks as you grow?”  
Against this backdrop, it is especially heartening to find organizations, including those 
that participated in this study, that have successfully navigated the “chutes and 
ladders” of growth. Their achievements are noteworthy, and their collective 
experiences offer a powerful body of knowledge for the leaders of other nonprofits that 
may be contemplating growth as well as for those organizations, like the Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation and the Bridgespan Group, that support such efforts. At 
the same time, these success stories—even more than any examination of 
organizations that have not survived—drive home the need for significant changes in 
the ways in which growth takes place in the nonprofit sector and the potential that 
could be unlocked by making changes.  
We undertook this study with relatively modest hopes: we wanted to develop a rich set 
of data to help us better understand the growth experiences of a select group of youth-
serving nonprofits. On this dimension, we believe the value of the study speaks for 
itself. Together, this white paper and the 20 individual case studies that lie behind it 
provide an extensive look at the experience and effects of growth on such 
organizations. 
At the same time, we are well aware that this work is only the first step toward a more 
comprehensive understanding of growth. So at this point, rather than summarize what 
has already been said in the preceding pages, we would like to close with some 
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questions and observations that might help to inform the efforts of others going 
forward. In so doing, we have drawn on both the contents of the study and the 
experiences of our two organizations in helping nonprofit organizations expand the 
reach of their services.  
Which organizations are candidates for growth?  
An obvious but useful reminder is that growth is not for every organization. Often small 
is beautiful, and there are many good programs whose virtue lies precisely in their 
being small. Further, there are many organizations that want to grow but are not yet 
ready to do so. At a minimum, premature growth can lead to limited resources being 
expended for naught; at the extreme, it can put the entire organization’s existence on 
the line.  
For these reasons, we believe it is crucial for all parties involved in the decision to grow 
a nonprofit to have a clear-eyed view on whether the staff and board of the 
organization are both willing and able to take on the challenges growth will bring. 
Force-feeding growth to an organization unprepared for it—or resistant to it—is a 
mistake from every perspective. This makes it especially important that we continue to 
advance our understanding of the factors that need to be in place before significant 
growth occurs. In our minds, one of the most critical unanswered questions is: what 
level of evidence of programmatic success a nonprofit ought to be able to demonstrate 
to justify investing in its growth? Similarly, how much organizational capacity (in the 
form of management skills, internal systems, and leadership and governance 
structures) is required to undertake growth, and what can be added along the way or 
after the fact?  
How can funders trying to support growing organizations be most 
helpful?   
Definitive answers to this question would be premature given the limits of our 
experience and research to date. However, the study does suggest a few possibilities 
that might be useful for funders interested in supporting growing organizations.   
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We begin, not surprisingly, with the proposition that planning matters. Supporting the 
development of a thoughtful growth plan can help an organization’s leaders clarify its 
strategic objectives and direction, and make it easier for them to differentiate 
opportunities worth pursuing from those more likely to threaten the mission. The 
planning process can also help bring an organization’s board and staff into alignment 
and foster strategic thinking among a larger set of its management team. Such 
perspective is especially useful to funders, as well, when they choose to place 
relatively big bets on a small number of grantees, as the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation has done. Both of our organizations have pursued planning activities with 
nonprofit organizations to good effect.    
Second, providing sufficient funds to either bolster or put in place missing, but 
essential, functions or capacities is not just helpful but critical for improving the 
chances of success. Whereas it was comparatively easy for the organizations studied 
to find funds for new programs, all of them struggled to obtain support for 
infrastructure—the people and systems that would enable them to deliver those 
programs effectively. The success of Harlem Children’s Zone, for example, suggests 
the value that can be created by helping nonprofits to build capabilities before their 
absence throws the organization into crisis. Providing such funding in a sufficient 
amount, either as unrestricted general operating support or flexible multi-year 
commitments, gives an organization’s leadership a running start and increases the 
likelihood that their efforts will be successful.  
Pooling capital with other funders and encouraging joint reporting is another potential 
way to improve support. Responding to multiple funders’ requests for information and 
satisfying their specific needs can distract organizations from their core objectives and 
impose a heavy burden on management’s time. Similarly, by cooperating to support a 
single growth plan, individual funders could help organizations avoid these additional 
hurdles and extra work that diverts them from delivering quality services to more young 
people in need.  
Last but not least, there is ample room for funders to support youth-serving 
organizations with resources other than money, for example: coaching and mentoring 
executive directors and other managers so they can better deal with the stresses and 
challenges that accompany growth; aiding organizations with board development and 
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strategy; helping with the creation of measurement systems and program codification; 
and providing other forms of capital, such as loans and program-related investments. 
There is also real potential for funders to make a difference by helping to 
professionalize the field of youth-service management, which lacks many of the 
support systems of other professions (such as teaching, firefighting, and medicine) that 
society finds essential. Such efforts could include creating and sustaining educational 
and training programs, professional associations, and periodicals as well as providing 
help from search experts, technology specialists, and other professionals.  
How can the flow of funds to proven programs be increased? 
Growth increases an organization’s need for funds, but it rarely opens new doors for 
obtaining them. Unlike in the for-profit sector, growth in the nonprofit sector is seldom 
rewarded by greater ease in attracting new money. In fact, an established track record 
and proven results can be serious impediments to raising funds, because 
philanthropists tend to gravitate to what’s new and different rather than what’s tried and 
true.  
Supporting new ideas, institutions, and social movements has been—and continues to 
be—an essential part of philanthropy’s purpose. However, an equally compelling case 
can be made for greater philanthropic support for programs and organizations that 
have demonstrated their ability to deliver results for participants. In principle, one might 
argue that investing in well-established organizations and existing service models 
could slow the development of new ideas. In reality, both current grant-making 
practices and the experience of the organizations in the study lead us to believe that 
the pendulum has swung too far toward novelty.  
From our perspective, there is an urgent—and growing—need to find ways to help 
established organizations expand their programs so they can have a far greater impact 
on society’s challenges. With budgetary pressures on state and federal government 
spending intensifying, it is increasingly hard to see where the funds to expand effective 
social-service programs will come from. But that said, government remains the 
dominant source of funding for programs affecting the lives of youth. We must find 
ways to ensure that government funding is better aimed at supporting programs with 
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demonstrated effectiveness and to increase the odds that the organizations that deliver 
those programs are able to attract the support they need to scale up.  
For the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation and a number of other funders, the most 
logical response to the current youth-services landscape has been to focus on larger, 
longer-term investments in proven programs. Given the depth and breadth of the 
problems so many of our society’s young people are facing, investing in organizations 
that have demonstrated results, rather than engaging in serial innovation in hopes of 
finding some untried silver bullet, makes enormous sense. Maintaining a robust civil 
society does not have to preclude building organizations that can provide kids with 
services that will help them change their lives. We hope that by conveying the lessons 
from these studies of growth in action, this paper will help to inform the choices made 
by other organizations and funders in ways that increase our collective ability to serve 
youth in need.               
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